As the Indian Navy prepares for Golden Jubilee celebrations next year to commemorate the induction of its first submarine in 1967, it has been struck by a story in an Australian newspaper which disclosed that 22,400 pages of documents pertaining to its Scorpene submarine programme, codenamed Project-75, had been leaked. This has caused quite a stir in defence circles around the globe and raised many pertinent questions related to management of major projects in increasingly technical environments.
The leak of highly sensitive documents relating to the six Scorpenes being built at the Mazagon Dock Limited by French company DCNS has dealt another blow to India's defence preparedness. There are worries that the leak has the potential to expose the combat and stealth capabilities of these submarines, particularly if they fall into the hands of India's strategic rivals in the Indian Ocean: China and Pakistan. With data pertaining to Scorpene sales to Malaysia and Chile also figuring among the leaks, it is believed that the theft occurred on the French side.
But the vulnerability that has always existed when dealing with private defence companies and arms dealers has gained another dimension with the data theft. The leak has happened just after DCNS snapped a $38-bn deal to build Australia's next generation of submarines. It has been speculated that the leak has been engineered by rival companies who lost the Australian deal to DCNS. If true, the perpetrators were seeking to sabotage the deal through undermining the French company's trustworthiness. After all, disguising the stealth capabilities and their parameters is what makes the submarine such a potent weapon.
But companies have only themselves to blame when they fall victims to hackers and corporate espionage. DCNS had entrusted the design documentation to consultants and sub-contractors for various aspects of the $3.5-bn deal like traniSlating documents from French to English, finalising the specifications, and procuring supplies of equipment and parts. It is hardly surprising then that DCNS lost the plot and its ability to keep tight control over who could access the documents.
Perhaps more important than the question of what has been leaked is how it was leaked. Based on the evidence so far, it can be reasonably assumed that the source of the leak was DCNS. Corporate rivalry is seen as the most likely reason. The fact that one individual was able to access such a large trove of documents covering all the major sub-systems when most such organisations work on the "need to know" principle, needs to be enquired into by the French govt. By completing the enquiry at the earliest, punishing the guilty and fixing the loopholes, France will be able to satisfy the concerns of India. Any exercise limited only to damage control will do disservice to India's national security.
